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Abstract: Regional Internet Address Registries (RIRs) are private, nonprofit 
and transnational governance entities that evolved organically with the 
growth of the Internet to manage and coordinate Internet Protocol addresses. 
The RIR’s management of Internet address resources is becoming more 
contentious and more central to global debates over Internet governance. 
This is happening because of two transformational problems: 1) the 
depletion of the IPv4 address space; and 2) the attempt to introduce more 
security into the Internet routing system. We call these problems 
“transformational” because they raise the stakes of the RIR’s policy 
decisions, make RIR processes more formal and institutionalized, and have 
the potential to create new, more centralized control mechanisms over 
Internet service providers and users. A danger in this transition is that the 
higher stakes and centralized control mechanisms become magnets for 
political contention, just as ICANN’s control of the DNS root did. In order to 
avoid a repeat of the problems of ICANN, we need to think carefully about 
the relationship between RIRs, governments, and Internet freedom. In 
particular, we need to shield RIRs from interference by national governments, 
and strengthen and institutionalize their status as neutral technical 
coordinators with limited influence over other areas of Internet governance.  
 
From 1995 to the present, the domain name system was the center of 
controversy and institutional change for global Internet governance. As this occurred, 
the major Regional Address Registries, ARIN, RIPE and APNIC, quietly evolved into 
highly technical, self-governing spaces that were off most people’s radar screen. As 
some academic observers noted at the time, the contrast between the politically 
charged ICANN space and the relatively obscure and quiet address governance space 
was puzzling. Address resources have always been as economically valuable as 
domain names, if not more so. Technically speaking, IP addresses are far more 
essential to the functioning of the Internet than domain names. Why did one resource 
management regime become the center of a global governance controversy while the 
other did not? If we can understand the answer to this question, we should also be able 
to explain what is now making IP addresses almost as controversial as domain names. 
And if we are really lucky, by comparing our prior experience with ICANN and 
domain names to the new predicament of the RIRs, we might be able to learn some 
useful lessons and anticipate and avoid some known problems.  
Two transformational problems are converging to make the management of  
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Internet address resources more contentious, and the RIRs more prominent in the 
debates over global internet governance.  
The most important is the impending exhaustion of the IPv4 address space. 
The RIRs were created to manage an Internet identifier resource, namely IPv4 
addresses. Some time in the last two years, it became evident that we will run out of 
IPv4 addresses soon. Near the end of 2008, the last remaining stash of unallocated 
address blocks – the so-called “free pool” – had dwindled to only 36 blocks. In recent 
times, these blocks of addresses have been distributed to regional address management 
entities at a rate of about 12 per year, which means we have only about a three year 
supply left. Demand may accelerate as exhaustion of this pool approaches, but even if 
it doesn’t the end of the free pool is within sight.1 The depletion of that resource pool, 
as we shall see, is a seismic shift of the very ground on which the RIRs stand, and will 
produce major transformations of their practices.  
Secondly, the growing demand for a more secure Internet is another critical 
arena of change. RIRs are affected by efforts to make the Internet more secure, 
especially in the area of routing. There has always been an intimate interaction 
between address management and routing. Up to now, however, the RIRs’ function of 
registering and rationing address resource utilization has been only loosely related to 
the routing practices of Internet service providers. This could change. Some of the 
secure routing proposals might give the RIRs the power to exert direct, operational 
control over Internet service providers.  
We call these problems “transformational” because they force the RIRs to 
become more formally institutionalized, make their role in internet governance more 
contentious and political, and raise the stakes of their policy decisions. As we shall see, 
these impending changes in the RIRs institutional capacity have both negative and 
                                                
1 A 2005 study by Cisco’s Tony Hain projected depletion of the IANA pool by 2010. Tony Hain, "A 
Pragmatic Report on IPv4 Address Space Consumption," The Internet Protocol Journal, Volume 8, 
Number 3. http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_issues/ipj_8-3/ipv4.html Another 
respected computer scientist who, in 2003, projected that the IPv4 address space would last “another 
three decades or so” now projects the depletion date of the IANA pool at January 2011, and the 
depletion of the regional subpools at November 2011. See Geoff Huston, “IPv4 Address Report” 
http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/ .  
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positive possibilities. RIRs could become a point of more centralized control over 
suppliers and users, and that could attract all the political problems that we now 
associate with ICANN. But these changes might also make address management more 
efficient and help fix some of well-known security problems. This means that we will 
need to think more broadly and comprehensively about the role of RIRs in Internet 
governance than we have before. It is no longer sufficient, or even helpful, for the 
RIRs simply to proclaim that they make policy in an open and bottom up manner. 
Open participation by itself offers no solution to the problems identified in this paper, 
and could actually make things worse. Instead, we need to think more deeply about 
what RIRs should and should not do, regardless of who participates in them. We need 
to carefully assess how their activities relate to governmental power, and about what 
rights individual Internet users and Internet service providers have within their 
governance regime. 
This paper begins with an analysis of what the RIR actually do. It then 
examines the two transformational problems facing the RIRs. The concluding section 
focuses on how the RIRs might respond to their impending politicization. It discusses 
the parallel with the ICANN experience and discusses the need for public policy 
principles applicable to the RIRs that can help safeguard the freedom of the Internet. 
The IP Address Governance Regime 
The Internet we know is based upon a data communication protocol known as 
Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4). IPv4 is a software procedure that moves data 
packets from one unique numerical address to the other.2 The 1981 standard that 
defined Internet Protocol created a fixed address field of 32 bits, which creates a 
mathematical possibility of about 4 billion unique addresses. Address blocks are 
assigned to private users in a hierarchical fashion. (See Figure 1) At the top of the 
hierarchy is ICANN, whose IANA function distributes large blocks of 16,777,216 
addresses (known as /8’s) to one of five regional Internet address registries (RIRs). 
                                                
2 RFC 791, Internet Protocol, DARPA INTERNET PROGRAM PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION, 
September 1981. See also RFC 790, Assigned Numbers, Jon Postel, September 1981.   
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The RIRs then accept applications from organizations with networks that need 
addresses within their territory. Some larger blocks may be assigned directly to end 
user organizations, but most will go to Internet service providers who will then re-
assign them to their customers.3  
Address block delegation
ICANN - IANA
Regional Internet 
Registry
Internet Service Providers 
1, 2 …n
Organizations 1, 2 …n
Large customers 
1,2,…n
DHCP pool
Sharing by smaller 
customers
 
Like all social institutions, the RIRs have developed an ideology about what 
they do and why they do it, which is codified in their own policy documents. Address 
resources are considered a “shared public resource” and the RIRs are considered their 
“stewards.” Addresses are said to be “loaned” to private users, not sold, and users are 
not supposed to gain any property rights in an address block they are granted. One can 
understand the political and economic pressures the RIRs face better, however, if one 
uses the tools of institutional economics to examine the historical evolution of the 
                                                
3 An allocation is defined as an address block given to an Internet service provider for intermediate use 
in selling internet service to other users. An address assignment is a block given to end users for their 
own use; e.g., corporations or universities with private networks. 
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institutional arrangements, the way they define rights to address resources, and the 
gaps and shortcomings of the regime.4 
 The initial distribution of IPv4 addresses began very informally in the early 
1980s, when the Internet was basically a research project. A computer scientist at the 
University of Southern California handed out big swaths of the available space to 
members of the American military-industrial-university complex: MIT, Stanford, 
Hewlett Packard, Motorola, General Electric, Halliburton, Defense Department 
agencies, etc. These are called “legacy allocations.” The creation of the RIRs led to 
tighter and more formalized address allocation and assignment policies, and more 
careful registration and tracking policies. Before they were created, however, a large 
portion of the IPv4 address space – one estimate says one third (OECD, 2008), another 
says 45%5 -- had already been assigned or allocated. A significant amount of these 
legacy allocations are still held without any contractual obligations. 
 RIRs were first created in the 1990s as the Internet protocols began to be 
widely adopted.6 The first Regional Internet Registry, RIPE-NCC, was created in 1991 
to serve the European region. In 1995 APNIC was created to serve the Asia Pacific 
region. Both were incorporated as private sector nonprofits. In 1997, parallel to the 
creation of ICANN, the address administration functions performed by several U.S. 
government contractors were privatized and placed in the hands of a new nonprofit 
entity known as the American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN). (Later, two new 
regional registries were created for the Latin America and African regions: LACNIC 
and AfriNIC, respectively.) 
From a resource management standpoint, the RIRs perform three functions: 1) 
they serve as a registry that coordinates the uniqueness of IP addresses; 2) they act as 
                                                
4 For a sampling of the institutional economics literature, see Elinor Ostrom, 1990. Governing the 
Commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action Oxford University Press; Elinor Ostrom, 
Roy Gardner, James Walker, 1994. Rules, Games, and Common-pool Resources. University of 
Michigan Press; Anderson, Terry L., Grewell, J. Bishop (2000) "Property Rights Solutions for the 
Global Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down?" In: Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum, Vol. X, 
No. 2, Spring 2000 
5 Author interview with Paul Wilson, APNIC Director, July 21, 2004.  
6 See RFC 1174 (1990) and RFC 1466 (1993) for the earliest documentation of the rationale for creating 
Regional Internet Registries.   
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gatekeepers that conserve address resources; and 3) they distribute addresses in a way 
that aggregates routes, thereby conserving scarce routing table space. 
 The registry function 
The most basic function of the RIRs is to maintain a registry that keeps track of 
which organization has been allocated or assigned which IP address block(s). 
Maintaining a registry allows service providers and others to see who has been 
assigned a specific address block, and so to coordinate their selections so that there are 
no conflicts or overlaps. Coordinating the uniqueness of IP addresses is an essential 
technical function; two different machines on the Internet attempt cannot use the same 
address at the same time without causing conflicts or malfunctions that can disable 
Internet connectivity. Registry information about address assignments can be retrieved 
from the RIRs’ “Whois databases.” This information is also useful for Internet service 
providers in determining their routing policies.  
The conservation function 
The RIRs also fulfill a conservation function by rationing access to address 
resources. Internet service providers and other organizations that want addresses must 
fill out a detailed request form and submit it to the RIR in their region. The form is an 
attempt to “justify” their “need” for the addresses. The RIR bases its needs assessment 
on engineering studies of the applicant’s plans, among other things. Thus, the 
definition of “need” underlying this regime is entirely technical; it does not take into 
account the relative economic value of alternative uses of addresses, nor does it 
reward technical configurations that conserve address space. In effect, the RIRs have 
instituted a system of central planning in which a bureaucracy rations access to 
address resources based on pre-formulated rules and criteria.7 In the course of 
                                                
7 See the general APNIC FAQ, http://www.apnic.net/info/faq/apnic_faq/obtaining.html; the ARIN 
Number Resources Policy Manual http://www.arin.net/policy/nrpm.html; and the RIPE IPv4 Address 
Assignment and Allocation Policies for the RIPE NCC Service Region 
http://www.ripe.net/ripe/docs/ipv4-policies.html  
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receiving address resources, the organizations and Internet service providers sign 
contracts with the RIRs, and these contracts are used to enforce the applicable policies.  
The route aggregation function  
One of the most important policy guidelines of the RIR regime is the need to 
aggregate routes at the top of the routing hierarchy. Hierarchical route aggregation is a 
response to a scaling problem caused by the growth of the Internet. Whenever possible, 
Internet service providers or organizations applying for addresses are given large 
blocks of contiguous addresses. By preventing end users or assignees from breaking 
up these contiguous blocks into smaller units and fragmenting them across different 
Internet service providers, the RIRs economize on the number of routes announced in 
the core of the Internet. If there were no aggregation of routes, the number of routes 
announced, it is feared, would expand beyond the capacity of routers to handle them. 
Thus in the mid-1990s the Internet community rejected what it called the “address 
ownership” model and adopted instead what it called an “address lending” policy. 
RFC 2008 was the seminal document making the case for a lending policy as only the 
model consistent with the need for hierarchical route aggregation.8 Although RIRs 
finance themselves via address-related fees and membership charges, they insist that 
members are not “buying” addresses but are merely paying the RIR for services 
associated with administering the address space and its registry. The RIRs formally 
prohibit assignees from reselling or transferring the addresses directly to other private 
users.9  
The line between permitted and not-permitted transfers is not always clear, 
however.10 The prohibition on decentralized transfers is justified by the RIRs on two 
                                                
8 RFC 2008, "Implications of Various Address Allocation Policies for Internet Routing" Y. Rekhter, T. 
Li. (1996).  
9 Route aggregation serves an important technical efficiency function but it also helps lock customers in 
to their Internet service providers. Internet service providers, not their customers, control the addresses, 
so when one switches from one vendor to another an organization may have to completely renumber its 
network, which is costly. 
10 Internet service providers who hold address allocations sell services commercially to their customers, 
and among these services are fixed IP addresses, with specific charges associated with addresses. When 
companies with IP address allocations or assignments are merged or acquired, RIRs allow the address 
resources to be transferred along with ownership of the company. 
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grounds. First, it is perceived as necessary to maintain their own role as central 
planners, or “need assessors.” If organizations could obtain addresses on an open 
market then willingness to pay, rather than a technical justification, would determine 
how addresses were allocated. Second, some control of how blocks are allocated is 
perceived as needed to maintain route aggregation.  
From Loose Governance to Centralized Governance? 
Overall, the RIRs have evolved into an effective but fairly loose self-
governance regime. Within this relatively informal governance regime, there is a great 
deal of slack. When considering the economic and political forces that are changing 
this regime, it is important to understand: where do they get their authority or 
influence, and when they are or are not able to enforce compliance; what is not 
controlled or imperfectly controlled by their methods; and how economic incentives 
put pressure on network operators to break or bend the regime’s rules.  
The RIRs’ primary source of governance leverage is their maintenance of an 
authoritative IP address registry, with an associated Whois service. As long as the 
world’s Internet service providers collectively recognize RIR’s registries as 
authoritative, an entry in the registry constitutes a legitimate and globally recognized 
claim to the exclusive use of IP address resources. The public Whois service allows 
Internet service providers (Internet service providers) to look up the identity of 
organizations that hold address blocks. Internet service providers will usually not issue 
route announcements for address blocks unless they first check the IP address Whois 
to see that the organization holding the block is actually who it claims to be and is 
their customer, vendor or peering partner. Thus while it is technically possible for any 
organization to appropriate any IP address block they please, appropriations of IP 
addresses that bypass the RIRs are more likely to encounter trouble in their attempt to 
be recognized and used by Internet service providers. In short, the RIRs derive most of 
their legitimacy and impact from the fact that Internet service providers pay attention 
to them and choose to use them as a basis for coordination. Bear in mind that Internet 
service providers and similar organizations with IP networks constitute the 
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membership of RIRs, and thus play a major role in determining their officers and 
policies. 
The same could be said, however, of the DNS root managed by ICANN and 
the U.S. Commerce Department. Theoretically, it is possible for the world’s Internet 
service providers to abandon the ICANN root and point to another. And yet it is 
obvious that strong network effects have made the world completely dependent on the 
DNS managed by ICANN and the U.S. Commerce Department, and any attempts to 
defect would be both costly and likely to cause global compatibility problems.11 Thus, 
over the past decade the seemingly distributed and voluntary system of domain name 
governance has become more centralized, more regulatory and increasingly political.  
In the analysis that follows, we show how the same could happen to the RIRs. 
We examine two forces that are creating pressures to change the informality of this 
governance regime: address scarcity and the demand for security. 
Transformational Problem #1: IPv4 Address Scarcity 
The most important change in the RIR environment is the depletion of the IPv4 
address space. Running out of IPv4 addresses poses serious challenges for the RIR’s 
governance model. Unfortunately, many people within that regime are still in various 
stages of denial about this.  
The RIR’s approach to resource management is based on two key assumptions: 
1) that there are free, unallocated resources available; and 2) that the task of the 
resource manager is to distribute unused addresses to organizations that actually want 
to use them in functioning networks (as opposed to hoarders, speculators or hogs). But 
once the IPv4 free pool runs out, the established methods of allocating address 
resources according to “justified need” loses its relevance. When all the IPv4 
addresses have been allocated to users, the concept of “need” becomes relative need 
rather than some engineering-based calculation of absolute need. In other words, it is 
possible to imagine five, ten or a hundred organizations that have a meritorious 
technical claim on some IPv4 addresses, but there may not be enough available 
                                                
11 Mueller 2002 
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addresses to satisfy all their requests. In the post-free pool world, address management 
does not mean judging whether an engineering plan or utilization levels justify a 
specific number of address blocks. In means, instead, the following things:  
 Making decisions about which of two, equally justified competing applications 
should get available addresses;  
 Transferring resources from less important, lower-valued uses to more 
important, higher-valued uses;  
 Reclaiming address resources that have been allocated but remain unused;  
 Trimming back overly large allocations to organizations that could make do 
with fewer addresses.  
The problem here is that the existing procedures of the RIRs cannot perform any of 
these functions well. To respond to these new demands, the RIRs must undertake a 
massive transformation of their policies and practices.  
Reclamation of unused address space, for example, is one of the biggest 
weaknesses of the existing regime. A large part of the allocated IPv4 address space 
seems to be unused, especially legacy allocations in the North American region.12 
Address blocks that are lying fallow can be surreptitiously taken over by spammers, 
illegal pornographers, or other Internet malefactors with a need to operate under cover. 
Spammers hijacked an entire /8 originally allocated to Halliburton in the 1980s.13 Two 
/16 address blocks, containing tens of thousands of IPv4 addresses, were hijacked 
from NASA and a small software company and used to facilitate spamming.14 In these 
two cases, the address blocks were essentially abandoned; their delegated users had 
completely lost track of their status and were not even aware of their appropriation by 
a third party. Routes for these misappropriated addresses can be announced even if 
they are not officially sanctioned by the RIRs. For example, the CIDR report for 
                                                
12 An OECD report cited a claim by Geoff Huston, Chief Scientist at APNIC, that 90% of RIR-allocated 
space is actually used (routed) while only 40% of legacy space is used. OECD (2008) p. 26-27. The 
report cites surveys that examine the population of visible IPv4 Internet hosts, and find that “only a low 
percentage of advertised addresses respond, which could mean that even among routed address space, 
significant address space is unused.” 
13 Google cache of The Complete Whois web site, retrieved 10 June 2008, 
http://completewhois.org/hijacked/hijackers.htm  
14 http://www.47-usc-230c2.org/ 47-usc-230c2, A web site maintained by Ronald F. Guilmette.  
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March 2008 lists 317 potentially bogus Autonomous System numbers and nearly 400 
possibly bogus route announcements. 
The appropriation of address blocks by spammers illustrates the weakness of 
the current RIR policies in dealing with unused or underutilized address space. When 
IP addresses are not used by those to whom they have been allocated, they do not 
automatically return into the common pool for use by others.15 Organizations that have 
been given IP address allocations retain them until they choose to give them up, 
regardless of whether they are actually being used. And they have very weak 
incentives to return addresses to RIRs.16 If they don’t give them back, nothing bad 
happens. If they do give them back, they incur both administrative costs (the cost of 
altering their records and interacting with the RIR) and opportunity costs (the cost of 
foregoing future use of the addresses). RIRs’ ability to monitor the actual usage of 
assignments is limited. Even if they did have perfect information about actual usage 
and “needs” of applicants, their enforcement powers are weak. 
The problem of address block reclamation is difficult enough when the RIRs 
are dealing with organizations with which they have established contractual 
agreements. But what about all the holders of legacy address blocks, which were 
allocated before the RIRs existed? Because they have no contracts with legacy holders, 
RIRs lack the authority to recover their resources or regulate their behavior, unless the 
legacy holders choose to give it to them. How big is this problem? Consider that one 
estimate says that 45% of the IPv4 address space was allocated prior to 1997. In the 
ARIN region, the Whois records associated with 2,357 Autonomous Systems and 
22,718 Organizations have not changed since the end of 1997, when ARIN was 
created. This is a good indication of the large number of entities that are formally 
outside the governance regime in North America, even though they may cooperate 
                                                
15 In a true common pool model, the IP address space would work like a gigantic DHCP address pool. 
(DHCP stands for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol, and defines mechanisms through which 
clients can be assigned a network address for a finite lease, allowing for serial reassignment of network 
addresses to different clients when one client ceases using an address. See RFC 2131.) Organizations 
would grab addresses (like catching fish) only when they were actually using them, and as soon as they 
were not using them the addresses would be released back into the common pool for use by others.  
16 In principle APNIC allocates addresses on an “annually renewable” basis. In practice it seems to rely 
primarily on the organization’s initiative to reclaim addresses. 
 12 
with or even participate in it. Since 2007, RIRs have made concerted efforts to bring 
the legacy holders into the contractual governance fold by developing a “Legacy 
Registry Service Agreement.”17 Take up by legacy holders has been modest, at best.18 
If reclamation will be difficult, what about transferring address resources from 
lower to higher-valued uses? Here again, the RIRs also do not appear to be well-
positioned to facilitate transfers. There are basically two ways for an agency to make 
judgments about the relative value of resources in alternate uses. One is to institute 
trading and competitive bidding for them; i.e., to institute a market allocation 
system.19 Transfer markets would allow organizations with address resources they 
think they can do without, to sell address blocks to an organization that needs/wants 
them.20 RIPE, APNIC and ARIN have all proposed and debated transfer policies. The 
proposals are extremely controversial within the RIRs because they undermine the 
RIR’s centralized control of the resources and due to anti-market sentiment. The 
alternative is to hold ongoing beauty contests based on expert judgment and/or 
community input; something akin to what was called “comparative hearings” in 
broadcast licensing, where administrative processes are used to assess the merit of 
competing claimants. These procedures are time and labor intensive and would not be 
welcomed by many in the industry.  
A robust policy debate about which of these options is preferable is now going 
on inside the RIRs.21 This paper, however, is concerned not with the normative debate 
                                                
17 ARIN’s new Legacy RSA contracts, http://www.arin.net/registration/legacy/index.html, bring 
uncontracted legacy address resource holders into the contractual system but promise not to reclaim 
unused resources.  
18 129 Organizations have signed the ARIN Legacy RSA as of August 2008. Of those, 66 of them 
already received new address resources and thus had signed a separate standard RSA with ARIN. So 
only about 63 new organizations were brought in by the program, out of tens of thousands.  
19 Each of the three largest RIRs is considering proposals to permit market-based address transfers. 
They are:  Asia-Pacific region: prop-050-v002: IPv4 address transfers (Huston); European region: RIPE 
2007-08, “Enabling Methods for Reallocation of IPv4 Resources.” (Titley and van Mook); North 
America region: ARIN: Policy Proposal 2008-2 IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal.  
20 Milton Mueller, Scarcity in IP addresses: IPv4 Address Transfer Markets and the Regional Internet 
Address Registries (July 20, 2008). Internet Governance Project. Paper IGP08-002. Available at 
http://internetgovernance.org/pdf/IPAddress_TransferMarkets.pdf 
21 For an assessment of the transfer proposals, see Mueller, M. “Scarcity in IP addresses: IPv4 Address 
Transfer Markets and the Regional Internet Address Registries,” (July 20, 2008). Internet Governance 
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over markets vs. no markets, but with a scientific assessment of the impact of IPv4 
scarcity on RIRs as governance institutions. From that perspective, it doesn’t really 
matter which of the two directions they choose. Either way, major changes will be 
required in the RIRs’ processes. RIRs will no longer be rationing access to a free pool 
of unoccupied addresses; they will be facilitating transfers among users and uses and 
reclaiming unused or underutilized address blocks. Both available methods of doing 
this (markets or administrative procedures) point in the same general direction: toward 
much more extensive record keeping, surveillance and enforcement capabilities. In 
short, an environment of resource scarcity will lead to much greater formalization and 
institutionalization of the RIRs’ administration of the address space, and a 
reconfiguration of their relationship to Internet service providers and other consumers 
of address resources.  
The market path 
One proposal for dealing with the problem of IPv4 address scarcity is a more 
liberal transfer market. As others have remarked, a market transfer policy requires 
RIRs to act as effective and authoritative “title agencies” for address resources. Before 
addresses can be exchanged between two parties, the buying party must feel confident 
that the selling party is the legitimate owner of the resource being exchanged, and that 
the resources it acquires will be recognized as its own on a global basis. Thus, the 
Whois record showing that an organization has been assigned a specific block of 
addresses will have much greater economic consequences once those addresses 
become, in effect, transferable use rights. The boundaries, limits and regulations 
associated with those rights will have to be more precisely defined. In authorizing and 
recording address transactions, the RIRs will have to be vigilant against fraud and 
misappropriation of address resources, otherwise its attempt to facilitate transactions 
will enmesh them in litigation and conflict when the transferred property rights are 
found to be defective or contested. The RIRs will have to monitor those who engage in 
these transactions carefully to make sure that they conform to regulations designed to 
                                                                                                                                       
Project. Paper IGP08-002. Available at 
http://internetgovernance.org/pdf/IPAddress_TransferMarkets.pdf  
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prevent speculation and hoarding. Transfer may require instituting “Resource Public 
Key Infrastructure” (RPKI) certificates to automatically authenticate resource 
claims.22 If transfers become common, the RIRs will also have to develop and enforce 
a whole new set of regulations designed to maintain route aggregation under the new 
market transfer regime.  
The nonmarket path 
Assume that the RIRs forsake market-oriented transfer policies and instead 
rely on more systematic reclamation and administrative procedures to respond to 
scarcity in IPv4. If this path is taken, the RIRs would have to make even more 
sweeping changes in their practices. First, they would have to invest in the institutional 
capacity to promulgate new standards regarding what would be considered “unused” 
or “insufficiently used” address resources, and then (somehow) acquire the legal 
authority to take those resources away from their nominal holders so that they could 
be transferred to other applicants. Second, they would have to apply those standards to 
all organizations in their region and identify and reassign the identified resources. 
Third, in re-assigning reclaimed resources, RIRs could no longer rely on their 
established engineering criteria; instead they would have to set up a competing claims 
process. In an environment with no free pool, multiple organizations will be able to 
present the RIRs with viable engineering plans for using the addresses. Engineering 
plans that technically justify the use of a certain number of addresses do not 
necessarily justify taking address allocations away from someone else, nor do they 
unambiguously tell you which of a dozen competing proposals is more worthy. So an 
RIR would have to decide which plan was more important or more valuable. Once 
RIRs start taking away resources from current holders, and making decisions among 
competing claimants about which plans are more worthy, they will need to be very 
formal and careful in their procedures, and hire lawyers, because mediating any such 
distributional conflict is bound to be contentious. These distributional conflicts in turn 
                                                
22 See the presentation of Randy Bush, “IPv4 runout, Trading, and the RPKI,” presentation at the 
Internet Institute of Japan, April 15, 2008. http://www.menog.net/meetings/menog3/presentations/bush-
080415.menog-v4-trad-rpki.pdf  
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will produce additional procedural formality and complexity in RIR processes, to 
protect both the RIR and the parties seeking resources. Fourth and finally, there is a 
danger that the absence of a legitimate private transfer market will fuel a black or gray 
market, which could lead to a breakdown in the accuracy and universality of the RIRs’ 
databases. If in an environment of scarcity the RIRs institute procedures for acquiring 
IPv4 addresses that are perceived as too costly or time-consuming, organizations may 
simply bypass them and begin trading address resources among themselves, leaving 
the RIRs out of the loop. Although trading address resources is supposed to be 
forbidden, by creating shell companies, or retaining organizational IDs associated with 
merged companies, it is possible to skirt these rules. 
So the RIR’s will have to invest significant resources in surveillance of address 
utilization and find stronger enforcement mechanisms to prevent transfers and 
appropriation outside the regime’s rules. Thus, even if address resources are not 
considered transferable property rights, in an environment of scarcity the RIRs will 
have to function as an effective title agency.  
Transformational Problem #2: Routing Security 
Communication over the Internet is dependent on two things: the ability to 
identify hosts, and the ability to identify routes that exist between hosts. Routing is 
currently a kind of self-governed commons, relying mainly on the implementation of 
the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and decentralized routing registries by Internet 
service providers, with a bow to the RIRs’ IP addressing allocation and aggregation 
policies. Though it has worked remarkably well for 15 years, the Internet’s routing 
system has no systematic security or authentication, which makes it susceptible to 
problems. 
The problem of insecure routing, a long known vulnerability, was illustrated 
dramatically last year when YouTube disappeared from the Internet for about an hour. 
The disappearance occurred because an ISP in Pakistan, acting under the orders of 
government censors to block YouTube nationally, accidentally propagated a route 
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announcement globally through a transnational Internet connectivity provider.23 As the 
route announcement was picked up by other Internet service providers, it had the 
effect of blocking YouTube across the entire global Internet. The same openness and 
flexibility, however, made it possible for Internet service providers to quickly correct 
the problem. 
Authenticating IP address block assignments 
Currently, there are efforts within the IETF and the RIRs to provide a method 
to authenticate the allocation of IP address block prefixes to Autonomous System 
Numbers (ASNs).  An Autonomous System (AS) is a technical name for a network 
operator,24 and AS numbers are unique integers assigned to network operators that are 
used to control routing. Since beginning work in 2005, the Secure Inter-Domain 
Routing (SIDR) Working Group has published several documents, including the 
Routing Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) protocol,25 which proposes to create a 
system containing digital certificates (as defined in RFC 3779) that bind 
organizational identity (i.e., ASNs) to assigned IP address block prefix(s).26  
According to the protocol, authenticating these certificates could rely on one or more 
trust anchors within the IP address space and AS number allocation hierarchy. 
However, the RPKI protocol does not specify which institutional entity(s) (e.g., the 
United Nations, the International Telecommunication Union, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, ICANN, the RIRs) might maintain them.  Alongside the standardization 
efforts at the IETF, the RIRs are developing the software necessary to support RPKI 
systems.  
                                                
23 Hong Kong-based telecommunication firm PCCW International.  
24 RFC 1930 defines an autonomous system as “a connected group of one or more IP prefixes run by 
one or more network operators which has a single and clearly defined routing policy.”, Guidelines for 
creation, selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS), available at 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1930#section-3 
25 See http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-arch-03 
26 See http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sidr/current/msg00000.html, and SIDR Working Group 
charter and documents at http://tools.ietf.org/wg/sidr/ 
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Authenticating route information 
While being able to authenticate the allocation of IP address block prefixes to 
ASNs is important, it is only a piece of securing Internet routing.  One must also have 
accurate and verified information about the interconnections or “routes” an 
autonomous system maintains and announces to the rest of the Internet.27  Sometimes 
“route objects,” which associate Internet routes with organizational ASNs, are stored 
in an Internet Route Registry (IRR).  In theory, information in an IRR can be used to 
verify route announcements made by Internet service providers and to filter fake or 
erroneous ones. However, there is currently no way to globally authenticate route 
object data contained in IRRs.  The IRR system is decentralized and voluntary. 
Several types of organizations (e.g., Internet service providers, RIRs) operate their 
own route registries, often mirroring route object data found in other registries.  A 
meta-registry of all operating IRRs is maintained by Merit Network’s Routing Assets 
Database (RADB). While it could be considered the de facto authoritative list for the 
IRR system, it does not have any contractual arrangements with other IRRs to 
maintain that information.  
Creating property rights in address assignments and route announcements 
In the past year, proposals have been submitted to ARIN,28 APNIC,29 and 
RIPE30 to develop RIR-based routing registries that combine global RPKI 
authentication of prefix assignments with route object authorization information.  This 
would provide the ability to authenticate not only what AS was using a particular 
prefix, but also what routes it announced to the Internet.  But as Arbor Network's chief 
security officer and Internet Architecture Board (IAB) member Danny McPherson 
pointed out, implementing this kind of system also raises major governance issues. It 
could fundamentally change the role of IANA and the RIRs because it could be used 
                                                
27 Route objects are exchanged between organizations over the Internet using the Border Gateway 
Protocol, which is another fundamental, insecure Internet protocol.  Efforts to make BGP more secure 
include sBGP, soBGP.     
28 See http://lists.arin.net/pipermail/arin-ppml/2008-May/010788.html 
29 See http://www.apnic.net/policy/proposals/prop-059-v001.html 
30 See http://www.ripe.net/ripe/policies/proposals/2008-04.html
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to link the control of IP number resources to control over what is routed on the 
Internet. To quote McPherson,  
“Upon full employment of such a system, …the IP resources allocation 
hierarchy that exists today, which is sort of an out of band function that has no 
direct consequence on what’s actually routed, now could have direct control 
over what’s actually routed on the Internet, and perhaps most importantly, 
what’s not. So, if you don’t pay your RIR membership fees, your address 
allocations could actually be revoked, and this could trickle its way into the 
routing system, where filters might be augmented to discard your route 
announcements, or into a protocol like SBGP where it’s actually automated.”31 
 
The basic point McPherson makes is that to “secure” a route, someone must be 
assigned an exclusive property right over the addresses to which a routing 
announcement refers, and also over the routing announcement space. Depending on 
how it is implemented, RPKI schemes could be used to make the enforcement of this 
exclusivity relatively automatic. Because the creation of this exclusivity function will 
likely rely on a hierarchical chain of certificate authentication, whoever controls the 
trust anchor(s) at the top of the hierarchy would be in a position to disconnect from the 
Internet anyone immediately below them in the hierarchy. This kind of power is, 
obviously, analogous to the control of the DNS root that became so contentious during 
and after the creation of ICANN. It creates a form of exclusivity and central control 
over the use of the addresses and routing that simply didn’t exist before. It would 
constitute a fundamental change in the governance status of the RIR regime, as the 
RIRs could gain a direct impact on operations that they have never had before. 
But it is not just the RIRs’ role that might change. The newly created 
centralized point of control might also attract the attention of litigants and 
governments. Think of indirect liability for peer to peer file sharing, or efforts to track 
down spammers or phishers. ICANN’s control of the DNS root gave it unavoidable 
forms of operational leverage over domain name registries and registrars, which 
served as a magnet for trademark/copyright interests and national governments 
                                                
31 D. McPherson, “IPv4 Exhaustion: Trading Routing Autonomy for Security.” Arbor Networks blog 
http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2008/03/ipv4-exhaustion-trading-routing-autonomy-for-security/ 
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seeking to assert forms of control over the internet. So could SIDR and RPKI give 
whoever controls the address assignment and routing authentication hierarchy the 
ability to exert significant forms of policy leverage over Internet service providers and 
their users. This trend could make the RIRs very much like ICANN indeed.  
Or, worse, it could expand the concentration of authority within ICANN even 
more. In June 2008, ICANN’s Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) 
asked the Board to budget a specific line item for "Management of certificates for the 
addressing system (RPKI).32 Like DNSSEC, there are policy questions to be explored 
around the hierarchical chain of authentication and trust anchor control. These issues 
are only beginning to be discussed outside of the technical community.  
The Need for a Policy Framework 
More effective systems of keeping track of who is using which IP addresses, 
and more secure and exclusive address assignments can bring important benefits to 
Internet administration: more efficient resource utilization, better technical 
compatibility, avoidance of hijacking. Likewise, more secure routing and better 
authentication of the interactions among Internet service providers can prevent major 
abuses and failures and help to deter criminal activity on the Internet.  
But any system of surveillance and administrative control can be politicized 
and abused. The ability to manage IP addresses is no exception. IP addressing has 
become the mechanism of choice both for tracking down Internet users and for 
enforcing actions against them.33 Routing announcements could also become regulated 
for similar purposes. The RIRs currently lack any mechanisms or principles to regulate 
or limit efforts to utilize their leverage over address assignments and routing 
management for political, policy or legal purposes. There is nothing in their 
procedures that encourage them to consider, much less protect, individual rights to 
                                                
32 B. Kuerbis, “Will ICANN move to control routing security? IGP blog, 25 June 2008. 
http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2008/6/25/3762527.html 
33 See the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s case archive on RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, in which 
an appeals court upheld Verizon’s right to protect the privacy of its customers when challenged by 
copyright interests seeking to link IP addresses to specific customer identities. 
http://www.eff.org/cases/riaa-v-verizon-case-archive    
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privacy, freedom of expression or due process of law. Yet, the RIRs are slowly and, 
apparently, unconsciously backing themselves into a position in which they may 
exercise forms of power over Internet service providers and users that bear on these 
broader questions of public policy. This has to change. The stakes are too high. 
The ICANN example: something to avoid 
The RIRs’ predicament creates a sense of déjà vu. As with ICANN, we see a 
global technical coordination system with a hierarchical delegation structure raising 
questions about the relationship between technical coordination and public policy for 
the Internet. It is our contention that that relationship as it first emerged around the 
formation of ICANN has since been handled badly – by the U.S. government, by 
WSIS, and by ICANN itself. Two aspects of the ICANN experience are worthy of 
notice. First, its unbalanced approach to rights protection, and second, the 
progressively expanding, camel’s-nose- under-the-tent role played by governments.  
During the creation of ICANN the U.S. Commerce Dept persistently rebuffed 
efforts to include freedom of expression as a principle of the ICANN regime, claiming 
that it was only “technical management.” The U.S. also has persistently opposed 
efforts to incorporate privacy rights protections into ICANN’s Whois. In both cases, it 
claimed to be focused on technical coordination, but in fact it was creating an Internet 
governance regime oriented around protecting the rights of trademark holders in the 
DNS. There was nothing inherently wrong with the effort to protect trademark rights, 
of course; what was wrong was the decision to elevate trademark protection above all 
other rights. The ultimate result was a biased regime that simply refused to recognize 
some kinds of rights claims.  
Another disturbing aspect of the ICANN experience has been the long term 
evolution of governments’ role in ICANN. The initial plan of ICANN was to privatize 
DNS administration and to keep governments out entirely. However, the U.S. first 
asserted for itself a temporary supervisory role. Once in that position, the U.S. refused 
to give it up its oversight powers – and the trademark interests and national economic 
interests (such as VeriSign) who benefited from the regime encouraged that stance. 
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The special U.S. role provoked other governments, heightening their demands for 
influence and control over ICANN’s day to day decision making processes. This 
power competition found a voice during WSIS, but seems to have only strengthened 
the U.S. resolve to hold on to its privileged position.  
ICANN originally dealt with the intersection of its technical management and 
public policy functions by creating a Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). 
GAC was initially conceived as a way of allowing governments a purely advisory and 
informational role while keeping them at arm’s length. But this did not work. GAC 
has regularly expanded its role in ICANN, and there are strong pressures to keep 
expanding it.34 It began by asserting authority over ccTLD delegations and moved on 
to assert for itself a privileged right to dictate anything that might be called a “public 
policy matter.” The GAC’s “advisory” role has now become a parallel policy making 
process that is equal if not superior in status to ICANN’s other Supporting 
Organizations. But GAC is not a treaty organization. When it proclaims something as 
its official “policy” it is not required to negotiate binding instruments and its 
constituent national governments are not required to go back to their legislatures to get 
approval. In effect, ICANN enables an informal consensus among a handful of 
governments to have binding force of international law. This isn’t right. 
ICANN’s new gTLD process provides a case in point. Five years ago it was 
inconceivable that ICANN would attempt to regulate the content of Internet web sites. 
And if governments attempted to negotiate a treaty that regulated speech 
internationally, both the U.S. and Europe would be bound by legal or constitutional 
guarantees of free expression and legislative and electoral checks and balances. But 
GAC policy advice is not bound by these constraints. Thus, due to a lethal 
combination of GAC policy principles and trademark/copyright owners, ICANN will 
censor a wide class of top level domain names irrespective of any free expression 
                                                
34 See the speech of ITU Secretary-General Hamadoun Toure, 6 November 2008 at the ICANN Cairo 
meeting. https://cai.icann.org/files/meetings/cairo2008/toure-speech-06nov08.txt  
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claims, not because of anything harmful in the names themselves, but because of the 
content that might be found under such domain names if they are assigned.35  
Thus, ICANN is rapidly evolving into a “worst of both worlds” situation: it 
eliminates many state-granted legal rights and due process protections by giving a 
private actor extensive regulatory and taxing power over the Internet, but it also 
facilitates unbalanced and extra-legal governmental interventions.  
Multistakeholderism and “bottom up” are not the answers 
The new fashion, when confronted with these problems, is to sing the praises 
of “multistakeholder governance,” and so-called “bottom up decision making.” The 
ideology of multistakeholderism celebrates the indiscriminate mixing of states, private 
business and technical governance. While multistakeholderism has served a good 
purpose in opening up intergovernmental organizations to participation by broader 
segments of society, it does not solve the problems identified in this paper, and could 
easily make them worse. 
Up to this point, RIRs have presented themselves to the public as bottom-up, 
open and effective governance structures. In many respects this is true. They are far 
more transparent and open to public participation than your typical intergovernmental 
policy making organization. Board members and Advisory Council members are 
directly elected by members, not through complicated and indirect representational 
and nominating committee processes as in ICANN. The policy making processes they 
run seem much less manipulated by management, and there is no equivalent to the U.S. 
Commerce Department political oversight hovering in the background to manipulate 
the process.  
The RIRs are currently based on a membership model, and joining an RIR 
presumes that the party joining the policy making process has a material stake in 
management of the resources. This is, on the whole, a good thing, because it closely 
aligns the primary users of the resources with the policy making process. RIRs are 
                                                
35 See the ICANN memo on “Morality and Public Order Objection Considerations in new gTLDs,” 29 
October 2008. http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/morality-public-order-draft-29oct08-en.pdf  
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similar to the IETF in that they are composed primarily of technical experts with a 
common background and shared norms. To invite the general public and government 
policy makers into this process actually contributes to the problem we have identified, 
namely the growing danger that technical management will be used to exert policy 
leverage without any well-defined rules or constraints to protect basic human rights. 
Broader, indiscriminate participation in RIR processes simply invites anyone with a 
political agenda to meddle in technical governance processes. While this may seem 
more democratic, in reality it only opens the door to organized special interests. Mr. 
and Ms. Ordinary Internet User are not going to spend weeks of their time reading 
email messages about route aggregation, provider-independent address blocks, and 
IPv6 migration strategies. The only people who will have the commitment and energy 
to enter into these processes will be organized interests with a political axe to grind. 
That means, e.g., copyright and trademark interests seeking leverage over Internet 
users,’ censorship advocates looking for new ways to get a grip on content providers, 
and so on.  
Toward a neutral core 
In order to avoid a repeat of the problems of ICANN, we need to think 
carefully about the relationship between RIRs, governments, and Internet freedom. As 
the RIRs migrate into a more formal and potentially politicized global governance 
regime, we need to find ways to institutionalize and preserve the RIRs’ mandate to 
remain minimalist technical coordinators whose sole mandate is maintaining efficient 
and effective Internet connectivity. Efforts to exploit their technical leverage to 
achieve policy objectives unrelated to address management must be resisted. We need 
to develop a legal and institutional firewall that separates the address management 
policies from the public policy concerns that need to be carried out at the national 
level by governments. This does not mean that governments, law and public policy 
considerations have no role to play in Internet governance. It simply means that those 
considerations have to be developed separately, in other institutions. The following 
principles might serve as guidelines: 
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 IP address management is best maintained through voluntary participation in 
transnational, private sector nonprofit organizations that do not have 
centralized and coercive authority over Internet service providers.   
 The RIR’s transnational mechanisms for Internet address resource allocation 
policies cannot and should not attempt to implement national-level public 
policies. 
 Insofar as possible, technical standards and protocols designed to solve 
security problems should avoid creating global bottleneck facilities that 
concentrate a dependency on a single point in the network. 
 
Current policy trends threaten to drag the RIRs into the more political Internet 
governance debates. The impact of their decisions remains centered on the technical 
infrastructure, but is expanding to include more economic, legal and political 
dimensions. The small community congregated around RIRs would probably be the 
first to admit that it is not in a position to make authoritative decisions about the 
proper tradeoffs between free expression and legal responsibility on the Internet, 
between individual privacy rights and public safety, between technical efficiency and 
competition, for the entire internet. Thus it is important for RIRs to restrict themselves 
to a narrowly technical mission and to resist attempts to load policy functions onto 
their address management mechanisms. 
 
